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ABSTRACT 
The United States Navy has established a Program Office for Acquisition, PMA-
268, to develop the Navy Unmanned Combat Air System (NUCAS). The NUCAS will be 
a fighter-sized aircraft capable of a variety of missions including deep-strike, Intelligence 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Time Sensitive Targeting (TST) and Air-to-Air 
Refueling (AAR). 
The NUCAS will offer new capabilities to the operability of a Carrier Air Wing 
(CAW). Potential benefits include improvements in combat sortie completion rate for 
manned aircraft such as the F/A-18 Super Hornet and the F-35C Lighting II Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF). 
In this thesis, we evaluate a strike scenario that focuses on the coordination of the 
NUCAS, the F/A-18 Super Hornet, and the F-35C Lightning II. We construct a 
simulation model of the scenario, and use a designed experiment to run 12,000 simulated 
coordinated strike events. We then use a variety of statistical and graphical tools to 
evaluate the result in order to determine the quantity of aircraft required for mission 
success, and operational factors necessary to limit friendly aircraft losses. 
The results indicate that a division of four NUCAS aircraft is advantageous, in 
terms of achieved high target casualty rates and high blue survivability rates. The results 
also highlight the necessity of stealth technology requirements in future aircraft 
development. 
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THESIS DISCLAIMER 
The reader is cautioned that the computer programs presented in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made, within 
the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logical 
errors, they cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs without 
additional verification is at the risk of the user. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Navy Unmanned Combat Air System (NUCAS) will be a fighter-sized 
aircraft capable of a variety of missions. The NUCAS will offer significant additions to 
the operability of a Carrier Air Wing (CAW) with improvements in combat effectiveness 
and aircrew survivability. With a projected combat radius of 1,500 to 2,100 nautical 
miles, the NUCAS should be able to strike targets deep within enemy territory. When 
deployed as part of a CAW, the NUCAS must safely and effectively be integrated with 
the over 70 other jet and rotary-wing aircraft currently operating on a modern naval 
aircraft carrier. 
In this thesis, we examine two questions: 
 What combination of manned and unmanned aircraft provides the best 
mission success rate? 
 What operational factors allow the NUCAS to complete its mission with 
limited loss rate to manned and unmanned aircraft? 
We design a coordinated strike scenario using an agent based combat-modeling 
program called Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA) to test the interaction of the 
NUCAS among current and future manned aircraft such as the F/A-18 Super Hornet and 
the F-35C Lightening II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). This coordinated strike scenario is 
created to stress the capabilities of each aircraft in order to gain some insight into the 
factors that provide for mission success and limited friendly aircraft losses. A variety of 
unit factors are included in the simulation, including aircraft starting locations, quantities, 
stealth, various sensor characteristics, and various weapons characteristics. By utilizing 
design of experiment techniques, we adjust these unit factors for each of the friendly and 
enemy agents, thus creating 240 different numbers of combinations that we evaluate and 
analyze. 
Our analysis of the 12,000 simulated results provides some insights about mission 
success and friendly survivability: 
 xx
 NUCAS aircraft should be operated in a group of at least three to four 
aircraft. 
 F-35C aircraft should operate in a group of at least four aircraft when used 
for OCA missions against a large number of enemy aircraft. 
 Stealth is an important factor for both successful target destruction and 
blue survivability. 
 Weapons Phit is a major factor in target destruction and blue survivability. 
Our approach shows how simulation, data farming techniques, and data analysis can be 
used to explore CAW operations. The results of our analysis can be used to assist the 
U.S. Navy and Naval Air System Command (NAVAIR) as they continue to develop 
tactics for the future of CAW and the NUCAS. By modifying the simulation model, 
adding exploring models of additional missions, or using this approach on other models 
of NUCAS capabilities and CAW operations, additional insights to the capabilities of the 




Aircraft carriers are one of America’s key power-projection systems. To 
ensure their continued operational effectiveness and survivability in the 
future security environment, they need to be equipped with new air 
platforms with greater range, greater persistence, and improved stealth. 
(Ehrhard and Work, 2007) 
A. OVERVIEW 
Naval aviation has changed dramatically over the past decade. The catalyst of this 
change was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of terrorist cells capable of 
coordinating the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001. There has been a shift from 
larger, long-ranged, single-role aircraft such as the F-14B Tomcat and A-6 Intruder, to 
the smaller, shorter-range, multirole F/A-18C Hornet and the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. 
The F/A-18 has been the “tip-of-the-spear” aircraft since 1983 and has proven itself to be 
very capable in carrier and combat operations. In Operation Desert Storm, a section of 
F/A-18 pilots were credited with two MiG-21 kills followed by the successful bombing 
of ground targets on the same mission. Ever since its introduction, the F/A-18 has 
continued to break records for availability, reliability, and maintainability (Federation of 
American Scientists, 2010). Within the next few years, the F/A-18 will replace all but the 
E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, and the MH-60 Seahawk 
helicopters in a Carrier Air Wing (CAW) 
A future aircraft, the F-35C Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is currently in 
testing and is planned to replace the older F/A-18C. The F-35C brings a decade of 
advances in sensors and avionics, vastly improved stealth utilizing internal armaments, 
and the promise of improved maintenance and reliability.  
As remarkable as these advances are, both the F/A-18 and the F-35C are 
surprisingly limited in their combat radius and endurance. The typical carrier air wing of 
the “Reagan Years” consisted of F-14Bs, A-6s, and other aircraft having combat radii 
well over 800 nautical miles. In contrast, our current F/A-18 aircraft is limited to roughly 
400 nautical miles using a typical combat configuration of air and ground attack 
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weapons. It is expected that the future’s F-35C will only extend combat ranges by 
another 100 nautical miles (Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 2009). 
An example of how combat range affects the Navy’s ability to support coalition 
forces can be seen in air combat operations of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). U.S. 
F/A-18s launch from the aircraft carrier stationed in the North Arabian Sea. They fly 
north, along the nearly 400-mile airspace corridor over Pakistan, before reaching 
Southern Afghanistan where they proceed to their first tanker. After tanking, they can 
expect to report on station and support ground troops for roughly two hours before 
requiring their second tanking. The F/A-18 aircrew will then spend roughly two more 
hours on station before having to join a third tanker in order to make the transit south and 
finally recover on the aircraft carrier. Tanking operations take time and require the 
aircraft to leave its area of responsibility to proceed to the tanker staging area. This 
greatly reduced the persistence, i.e., the ability of an aircraft to loiter over the area of 
concern. There is clearly room for improvement. 
B. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
The Navy has committed to developing and acquiring the Navy Unmanned 
Combat Air System (NUCAS). The NUCAS will be a fighter-sized aircraft capable of a 
variety of missions, including Deep-strike, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR), Time-Sensitive Targeting (TST), and Air Refueling (AF). 
The NUCAS will significantly advance carrier aviation where manned and 
unmanned aircraft will work in partnership within a single environment. The Navy 
anticipates that the NUCAS will offer significant additions to the operability of a Carrier 
Air Wing with improvements in combat effectiveness and aircrew survivability. 
The NUCAS has the potential to restore the U.S. Navy’s deep strike capabilities, 
and to extend the combat radius required for effective combat operations. With a 
projected combat radius of 1,500 to 2,100 nautical miles, the NUCAS should be able to 
strike targets deep within enemy territory. The NUCAS is also being developed with the 
capability of receiving in-flight aerial refueling, thus extending the NUCAS’s range 
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almost indefinitely. With in-flight refueling, a NUCAS could conceivably stay airborne 
for hundreds of hours without any of the concerns that have affected manned aircraft, 
such as pilot fatigue or performance-related blackouts. This not only benefits the Navy’s 
deep-strike capability but also increases the NUCAS’s potential loiter time. This suggests 
that ISR missions could greatly benefit from the nearly unlimited on-station time the 
NUCAS provides. 
The current NUCAS Demonstrator, Northrop Grumman’s X-47B, is still in its 
development phase. The current objectives (Northrop Grumman, 2010) are to: 
demonstrate the technical feasibility of carrier landings with a tail-less, low observable 
relevant platform prototype, continue the maturation of relevant carrier landing and 
integration technologies, and conduct actual NUCAS carrier landings. 
The NUCAS must safely and effectively be integrated with the over 70 other jet 
and rotary-wing aircraft currently operating within the cramped, 4.5 acres of a modern 
naval aircraft carrier. Once the Navy demonstrates the feasibility of NUCAS carrier 
landings, continued development will determine missions and tactics that effectively 
employ the NUCAS within the CAW. 
2. NUCAS Missions 
The two most obvious missions include Intelligence Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) and Time Sensitive Targeting (TST), due to the requirements for 
extended range and loiter time offered by the NUCAS. Air-to-ground missions for the 
NUCAS may include Close Air Support (CAS), long-range strike, and coordinated strike. 
Future advances may include an air-to-air capability on the NUCAS thus expanding 
missions to include Offensive Counter Air (OCA), and Defensive Counter Air (DCA). 
This thesis focuses on the coordinated strike mission. We choose the coordinated 
strike scenario because it is the hallmark training scenario for all fixed-wing carrier 
aviators. The complexities that arise from operating multi-purposed aircraft within the 
same battle-space can be challenging. Each aircraft has its area of responsibility to 
include: 
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 Initial air-to-air engagements 
 Air-to-air protection for the air-to-ground strike aircraft 
 Air-to-ground strike aircraft 
 Electronic Attack (EA) aircraft 
 Command, Control and Communications (C3) aircraft 
 Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft 
In this thesis, we model the first three aspects. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Thus the objective of this thesis is to demonstrate how the NUCAS can be 
evaluated through the use of simulation, design of experiments, and data analysis. 
Specifically, this thesis evaluates a coordinated strike scenario utilizing the NUCAS as an 
air-to-ground strike aircraft and Offensive Counter Air (OCA) supplied by F/A-18 and F-
35C aircraft. Specific questions directing this thesis include: 
 What combination of manned and unmanned aircraft provides the best 
mission success rate? 
 What operational factors allow the NUCAS to complete its mission with 
limited loss rate to manned and unmanned aircraft? 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
 The Naval Air System Command (NAVAIR) is responsible for the future 
capabilities of aircraft and aircraft-related weapons systems. Effectively integrating the 
NUCAS into the future CAW will require decisions on how many UCAVs should be in 
an airwing, what functions they should be expected to have, how their presence will 
change current airwing operations, etc. The findings of this thesis provides preliminary 
insights to Navy decision-makers that may help them address these issues. This thesis 
also serves as an example of how simulation experiments and data analysis can be 
leveraged to investigate CAW operations. A similar approach may be beneficial for 
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assessing a variety of CAW missions involving NUCAS. As the NUCAS moves beyond 
its demonstration phase, more detailed models of NUCAS capabilities and CAW 
operations can be developed. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
 Utilizing analytical techniques developed and implemented at Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS), this thesis provides some preliminary guidance about the operational 
requirements of the NUCAS in a variety of mission areas. Design of experiments 
techniques and procedures are utilized to vary NUCAS operational parameters. We create 
scenarios using an agent-based computer simulation modeling platform called Map 
Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA). By using MANA, baseline scenarios can be 
created relatively quickly, and then investigated using an approach known as data 
farming. In data farming, simulation parameters are varied according to a designed 
experiment, to create a set of well-chosen variations of the scenario. These variations are 
simulated multiple times, and the data analyzed to identify those parameters that have the 
greatest effect on mission success. This helps future developers focus on the parameters 
that actually make the biggest impact, therefore providing better insights about NUCAS 
employment and effectiveness. 
 6
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 7
II. SIMULATION DEVELOPMENT 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides further elaboration on the NUCAS and the simulation 
model used to test the tactics in which the NUCAS can be expected to operate. The 
purpose of this thesis is not to recreate every conceivable operational environment in 
which the NUCAS might be employed, but to look at a coordinated strike scenario 
simulation. Our scenario is constructed in Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA), 
an agent-based simulation developed by the Defense Technology Agency (DTA) of New 
Zealand. 
B. MANA SIMULATION 
The primary strength of MANA is that it can be utilized effectively to generate 
simulation experiments in a relatively quick fashion. MANA allows various assumptions 
and agents characteristics to be parametrically changed and the simulation run again. This 
facilitates the ability to investigate the impacts of varying several independent factors on 
mission outcome. MANA is well documented, providing information on MANA’s many 
uses, agent parameters, and capabilities. 
MANA was designed by DTA to research the often-random complexities of 
combat operations. As an agent-based simulation, MANA focuses on individual “agents” 
that have characteristics that can be adjusted utilizing a wide variety of parameters. Some 
of the major agent parameters include: 
 Type (i.e., enemy, friendly, neutral) 
 Quantity 
 Speed 




 Communications between agents 
 Interaction characteristics between various other agents 
 
MANA is extremely customizable, allowing for a wide variety of problems to be 
modeled through simulation. Many components, such as sensors and weapons, are fairly 
detailed and include parameters such as probability of hit and probability of kill for 
variable ranges. Other aspects, such as fuel usage, are rather simplistic, with only a single 
fuel-consumption rate for a particular agent. 
DTA performs periodic updates to MANA. We use version 5.00, known as 
MANA V, for this thesis’s simulation building process. Figure 1 shows the start-up 
screen for MANA V. 
 
Figure 1.   Screen Shot of MANA V Startup Screen (From Defense 
Technology Agency, 2010) 
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C. MISSION SCENARIO 
A Carrier Strike Group (CSG) is operating off the coast of a threatening nation. 
Intelligence reports that the threatening nation is in the process of resurrecting a ground-
based anti-ship missile system near its coast. This missile system has been deemed a 
threat to region stability. 
1. Enemy Forces 
Enemy defenses include two squadrons of Chinese-built Chengdu J-10 aircraft. 
All enemy aircraft operate from a known airfield located on the coast. Intelligence reports 
that the enemy aircraft have been regularly conducting Combat Air Patrol (CAP) 
missions along the coast. SIGINT also suggests that the enemy has alert aircraft that can 
be launched from the airfield on short notice. The enemy has a very robust early warning 
detection system, providing the capability to classify and target air contacts using Ground 
Controlled Interception (CGI). 
2. Friendly Forces 
The CAW consists of three squadrons of TACAIR aircraft: F/A-18F Super 
Hornets, F-35C Lightning IIs, and the NUCAS strike aircraft. The F/A-18F and F-35C 
are configured for air-to-air engagements and are primarily responsible for protecting the 
strike aircraft. The NUCAS is the strike aircraft and is configured with air-to-ground 
weapons. The NUCAS is the strike aircraft, rather than a manned aircraft because of the 
significant threat over the enemy target area. 
3. Terrain and Scale 
The Area of Operations (AOA) is a 500 NM by 500 NM area with the threatening 
country towards the north and the CSG located in the south. The enemy J-10 CAP aircraft 
are already on station and will respond immediately to any perceived threat that 
approaches their coast. The enemy airfield is located to the northeast on the coast and will 
launch aircraft to intercept an inbound air threat. 
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4. Mission 
The Carrier Air Group (CAG) has been ordered to plan and conduct a coordinated 
air strike on the threatening county. The primary target is the anti-ship missile system 
near the coast. The F/A-18F and F-35C aircraft will provide offensive counter air, 
targeting any enemy aircraft they encounter. The NUCAS will strike the target using 
GPS-guided bombs. We also assumed that EA, C3, and SIGINT capabilities will be 
provided by other aircraft, but do not explicitly model these in the simulation. Figure 2 
shows the MANA screen shot of the coordinated strike scenario. 
 
 
Figure 2.   MANA Screen Shot of Coordinated Strike Scenario (After 
Defense Technology Agency, 2010) 
D. SIMULATION MODELING CHARACTERISTICS 
This section describes the various characteristics of the MANA simulation model 
that we use for this thesis.  
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1. Goals of the Simulation 
 The NUCAS is still in the development process with limited test flights being 
scheduled for early 2010. An actual NUCAS carrier landing will not be conducted until 
late 2010 at the earliest. It is expected that a squadron of NUCAS aircraft will not be 
established until 2015. Using an actual aircraft in a war game against an enemy threat 
simply cannot be accomplished, thus the reason for simulation. 
 The simulation and scenario are created to stress the capabilities of each aircraft 
in order to gain some insight into the factors that provide for mission success. For this 
simulation, mission success is measured in the ability of the friendly agents to 
successfully destroy the target area. Friendly losses are also evaluated because losing 95 
percent of your friendly forces to destroy a target is not considered a mission success. 
 In order to determine mission success, the simulation has a variety of unit factors 
that include: location, quantity, stealth, various sensor characteristics, and various 
weapons characteristics. By utilizing design of experiment techniques, we adjust these 
unit factors for each of the friendly and enemy agents, creating an abundant number of 
combinations that can be evaluated and analyzed.  
2. Time, Scale, and Map 
MANA is a time-stepped model that requires pairing between the simulation 
clock and the actual world event that is being simulated. This simulation uses 30 seconds 
to represent a single time step. The simulation time typically takes no more than 235 
steps, corresponding to just less than two hours of actual time. 
MANA refers to the geographical area within the model as the “battlefield”. For 
this simulation the battlefield is x = 50.0 by y = 50.0 grid which corresponds to 500 by 
500 nautical miles of geographical area. Coordinates start in the upper left quadrant of the 
battlefield and increase until reaching the bottom right quadrant. 
MANA has an upper range limit of 100,000 meters, or 62.14 miles. MANA 
sensor and weapons ranges are a few of the factors that have this limit. Since this thesis 
required sensor ranges beyond 62.14 miles but not beyond 621.4 miles, we reduced the 
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battlefield scale by a factor of 10. All simulation distances are reduced by this factor in 
order to overcome the MANA limitation. Figure 3 shows the battlefield settings menu, 
where map size and model time step are indicated. 
MANA provides a means for maps to be added to the simulation background. A 
map of the simulation area was obtained from a screen capture of Google Earth, darkened 
using Adobe Photoshop, and then saved as a .bmp image. The image was then imported 
into MANA by manually updating the <Battlefield> portion of the code in the eXtensible 
Markup Language (XML) file. Introducing this map in the background does not impact 
the agents being simulated or their behavior. The background map is simply used to 
increase user situational awareness of the simulation area. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Screen Shot of the Battlefield Setting Menu (From Defense 
Technology Agency, 2010) 
3. Enemy Forces 
This scenario uses three enemy agents as described in Table 1. 
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Agent Icon Description 
CAP J-10  
Aircraft already in flight (on patrol) at the 
start of simulation. 
Alert J-10  
Aircraft on alert at the airfield for launch as 
directed (random). 
Target Area  The ground-based anti-ship missile site. 
Table 1.   Enemy Agents Used in MANA Simulation 
MANA uses the term “squads” to represent agents. The scenario starts with all 
squads in position; their start locations are determined by a home position and box size 
centered on the home location. The CAP J-10s are located at their CAP station, 
designated in MANA as x = 25 and y = 8. The individual aircraft associated with this 
squad are randomly populated within a rectangle box of x = 5.0 and y = 2.5. As 
previously mentioned, all measurements are reduced by a factor of 10; therefore this 
corresponds to a real-world area of 50 by 25 nautical miles. 
The Alert J-10s are located at their associated airfield located in MANA as x = 40, 
y = 12. Once the simulation starts, a countdown timer of 3600 seconds (1 hour) is 
activated. All Alert J-10s will launch at random intervals until the 3600 seconds is 
reached. 
In MANA, “Squad Personalities” determine how squads react with other agent 
squads. Various levels of personalities can be adjusted from -100 to +100, thus allowing 
for a wide variety of squad characteristics and behaviors. For example, a squad assigned a 
-100 to “Enemy Threat” would respond by moving away from that threat. Conversely, a 
squad assigned a +100 would move towards that threat. Both the CAP J-10s and Alert J-
10s are set to pursue all threat aircraft with +100. If no threat aircraft are within sensor 
range, the aircraft have a secondary personality, of +15, to move towards their waypoint 
located at x = 25, y = 15. 
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Another factor of a squad is what MANA refers to as “concealment.” 
Concealment affects the probability that a squad can be seen in a given time step. For 
example, a squad having a concealment value of 1.00 is completely invisible. Conversely, 
a squad having a value of 0.0 is completely visible. For aircraft like the J-10, this 
concealment value can be associated with stealth. Both the J-10 squads are given an 
adjusted concealment level from 25 to 90 percent of the base concealment. This 
corresponds to a real-world RADAR Cross Section (RCS) of 0.75 to 0.1 m2 RCS 
(Grining, 2000). 
Sensor range can also be adjusted. Both J-10 sensor classification ranges are set to 
the maximum limit of 100,000 meters (621.4 miles). This maximum range is chosen to 
simulate the added advantage the enemy country has when classifying air targets as 
threats. We assume that the enemy has established a no-fly exclusion zone, so any aircraft 
approaching their coast will be declared hostile and fired upon.  
MANA also allows for a wide variety of weapons to be employed for each squad. 
The J-10 employs two primary air-to-air missiles: The PL-12, medium-range, active-
radar missile and the PL-8, short-range, infrared seeking missile. The PL-12 and PL-8 
quantity, range, and probability of Kill (Pk) can be adjusted in MANA’s “Weapons” tab 
of the “Squad Properties” menu. Using design of experiments, we adjust each of these 
factors during the simulation. Table 2 describes the factors, along with their minimum 
and maximum values. 
The “Target Area” is specified as a squad as well. However, the target area is very 
different from the other squads since it does not have a movement, personalities, 
weapons, or sensors. The Target Area has only two parameters associated with it. The 
first is a threat level that is only targeted by the NUCAS. The second parameter is a 
requirement that two NUCAS hits are necessary in order for the target to be destroyed. 
These two parameters are necessary in order to keep air-to-air units from attacking the 
Target Area, and to create a more realistic scenario in which two bomb hits are required 
for successful destruction. 
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Agent Factor Min Max Explanation (Units) Notes 
J-10 CAP Number of Agents 1 20 Number of aircraft   
  Movement Speed 25 80 Speed (knots x 10)   
  Personal Concealment 25 90 Probability of detection (%) 0.75–0.1 m2 RCS 
  PL-12 Weapon Shots/Ammo 1 6 Number of weapons   
  PL-12 Weapon Range 5632 8046 Weapons range (meters x 10) 35–50 miles 
  PL-12 Weapon Hit Rate per Discharge 0 1.00 Probability of hitting target (%)   
  PL-8 Weapon Shots/Ammo 2 4 Number of weapons   
  PL-8 Weapon Range 322 1609 Weapons range (meters x 10) 2–10 miles 
  PL-8 Weapon Hit Rate per Discharge 0 1.00 Probability of hitting target (%)   
J-10 Alert Number of Agents 1 20 Number of aircraft   
  Movement Speed 25 80 Speed (knots x 10)   
  Personal Concealment 25 90 Probability of detection (%) 0.75–0.1 m2 RCS 
Table 2.   Table of Enemy Factors and Their Associated Min/Max Values 
4. Friendly Forces 
The scenario uses three main friendly agents, as described in Table 3. 
 
Agent Icon Description 
NUCAS 
 




OCA aircraft configured with air-to-air 
missiles. 
F-35C  
OCA aircraft configured with air-to-air 
missiles. 
Table 3.   Friendly Agents Used in MANA Simulation 
The friendly squads start the simulation on the southern portion of the battlefield. 
The NUCAS are located the furthest south at the start position of x = 25 and y = 47.5. 
Since the NUCAS are the only aircraft in the strike package with an air-to-ground 
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weapon, it is vital that other aircraft protect the NUCAS from any air-to-air threats. These 
protection aircraft are referred to as Offensive Counter Air (OCA) and they have the 
responsibility of clearing the airspace of enemy aircraft. The F-35C and F/A-18F are the 
OCA and will have a start location of x = 25; their y = locations varies between 27.5 to 
47.5 placing the OCA aircraft in front of the strike NUCAS. 
In addition to the start location, each of the friendly squads also has waypoints 
which they move towards. The first waypoint is located at x = 25 and y = 3.5 and 
corresponds to the target location. Once the friendly squads reach the target waypoint, a 
second waypoint is activated and a return to the final location at x = 25 and y = 47.5 is 
directed. 
The squad personalities for the NUCAS and the other blue aircraft are very 
different from each other. The NUCAS has two threat levels that it uses to differentiate 
between the J-10 threat and the Target Area threat. The NUCAS will proceed towards the 
Target Area with a personality weight of +100 and it will move away from the J-10 threat 
with a personality weight of -30. The F/A-18 and the F-35C have only one threat, the J-
10s, and they will move towards that threat with a personality weight of +100. Also, in 
order to keep all of the blue squads moving along the flight path, we implemented a 
personality weight of +30 for proceeding to the specified waypoint. 
The MANA concealment factor for the blue squad representation is the same as 
for the J-10, except the values are higher to represent the smaller RCS values of the 
stealthy F-35C and NUCAS. Table 4 lists the personal concealment values for each of the 
friendly aircraft in the simulation model. 
Research done on the sensor classification range and aperture provided a wide 
variety of capabilities. The sensor systems for all of the blue squads are classified, but we 
obtained reasonable numbers from unclassified sources such as Jane’s Aircraft. The 
NUCAS sensor systems have not been developed at the time of this thesis so assumptions 
are necessary. Since the NUCAS is smaller than the F/A-18, we assume that the sensor 
systems for the NUCAS will have to be small as well, therefore the NUCAS will have a 
range and aperture arc similar to those of a current F/A-18F aircraft. The F-35 RADAR, 
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the AN/APG-81, will have substantial higher ranges and capability than the current 
F/A-18’s AN/APG-74 (Northrop Grumman 2010). Table 4 lists sensor classification 
ranges and aperture arcs for each of the blue squads. 
 
Agent Factor Min Max Explanation (Units) Notes 
NUCAS Number of Agents 1 12 Number of aircraft   
  Movement Speed 25 65 Speed (knots x 10)   
  Personal Concealment 98 100 Probability of detection (%) 0.0015–0.0001 m2 RCS 
  Sensor Class. Range 9656 16093 Sensor range (meters x 10) 60–100 miles 
  Sensor Aperture Arc 40 120 Sensor width (degrees)   
  GBU-31 Weapon Shots/Ammo 1 2 Number of weapons   
  GBU-31 Weapon Range 805 2736 Weapons range (meters x 10) 5–17 miles 
  GBU-31 Weapon Hit Rate  0 1.00 Probability of hitting target (%)   
F/A-18F Number of Agents 1 12 Number of aircraft   
  Home Waypoint Location y: 47.5 27.5 Distance aircraft is in front of NUCAS 0–200 nm 
  Personal Concealment 25 90 Probability of detection (%) 0.75–0.1 m2 RCS 
  Sensor Class. Range 9656 16093 Sensor range (meters x 10) 60–100 miles 
  Sensor Aperture Arc 40 120 Sensor width (degrees)   
  AIM-120 Weapon Shots/Ammo 1 6 Number of weapons   
  AIM-120 Weapon Range 4989 15289 Weapons range (meters x 10) 31–95 miles 
  AIM-120 Weapon Hit Rate  0 1.00 Probability of hitting target (%)   
  AIM-9 Weapon Shots/Ammo 2 4 Number of weapons   
  AIM-9 Weapon Range 966 1770 Weapons range (meters x 10) 6–11 miles 
  AIM-9 Weapon Hit Rate  0 1.00 Probability of hitting target (%)   
F-35C Number of Agents 1 12 Number of aircraft   
  Home Waypoint Location y: 47.5 27.5 Distance aircraft is in front of NUCAS 0–200 nm 
  Personal Concealment 98 100 Probability of detection (%) 0.005–0.0015 m2 RCS 
  Sensor Class. Range 9656 19312 Sensor range (meters x 10) 60–120 miles 
  Sensor Aperture Arc 40 180 Sensor width (degrees)   
Table 4.   Table of Friendly Factors and Their Associated Min/Max Values 
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The friendly squad weapons systems are very similar to those of the enemy 
squads. The F/A-18F and F-35C, configured for air-to-air combat, will carry a 
combination of AIM-120 AMRAAM and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles. The AIM-120 is a 
medium-range, active-RADAR missile. The AIM-9 is a short-range, infrared-seeking 
missile. The AIM-120 and AIM-9 are broken down into just three factors for each 
weapon: quantity, range, and probability of hit. 
The NUCAS will carry two internal GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack Munitions 
(JDAM). The JDAM is a 2000 lb GPS guided bomb used for ground targets. The 
NUCAS will not have air-to-air weapons capabilities. The weapons factors for the F/A-
18F, F-35C, and NUCAS are also listed in Table 4.  
5. Sources, Abstractions, and Assumptions 
It is important that the sources of input data, model abstractions, and assumptions 
are addressed. Obtaining the source material for effectively simulating the aircraft and 
weapons systems in MANA took a large percentage of the modeling process time. The 
sources for the performance characteristics were obtained from a wide variety of 
unclassified sources, including, Jane’s Aircraft, the Federation of American Scientists, 
Global Security.org, and an assortment of aircraft and weapons defense corporation Web 
sites. 
Air combat is a very physics-based environment with weight, thrust, drag, and lift 
being common characteristics. Air combat is also a three-dimensional environment where 
altitude advantages often drive the tactics that are developed. Modern day weapons, 
including missiles and self-steering bombs, also benefit from being studied in a physics-
based, three-dimensional world. 
MANA is very limited in its ability to model altitude; therefore, this thesis 
abstracts all squad aircraft and weapons characteristic by placing them at the same 
operational altitude. In short, the simulation has abstracted the three-dimensional world 
of air-combat into a top-down, two-dimensional simulation model. 
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Sensor and weapons ranges are also very simplified. Each of the squads in this 
simulation uses a single classification range. This is unlike real-world operations where 
detection probability tends to decrease with range. The probability of detecting a small 
RCS contact decreases as the contact gets further from to the detection sensor. Weapons 
ranges and probability of hit (Phit) are also simulated in this fashion, with only a single 
range and Phit for each of the weapons parameters. MANA does have the ability to assign 
ranges with various Phit for those ranges, however, that feature was not utilized for this 
thesis since the additional detail was not necessary given the simplification of altitude. 
Fuel consumption is an abstraction in MANA offering limited application. A 
single value of fuel consumption per time-step can be assigned; however, combat aircraft 
do not consume fuel at a constant rate. A multitude of factors such as speed, altitude, and 
configuration, all provide various factors to the fuel consumption rate. Since the 
coordinated strike scenario does not challenge the combat radius of the aircraft being 
simulated, it was decided to eliminate the effects of fuel from the simulation. 
Communication between squads is another characteristic that can be defined in 
MANA. This simulation assumes that all communications are perfect and do not have a 
limited range. 
Failure of equipment and operator error is a characteristic that plagues modern-
day aircraft and systems. This simulation assumes that equipment failure does not exist; 
however, A Phit range from 0.0 to 1.00 is defined for each of the weapons used in the 
simulation. 
6. Summary 
“Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful”, is an oft quoted phrase 
from the statistician George E. P. Box (DeGroot, 1987). The intent of this thesis is to 
evaluate the effectiveness of using NUCAS as a force-multiplier in future Carrier Air 
Wings. Simulation models are a useful way to mitigate the human and financial risk 
involved in actual air-to-air combat. 
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III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Data farming is an approach where multiple variations of a model are generated 
by varying the input parameters in a well-chosen manner, using experimental design (see 
Sanchez and Wan, 2009). In this thesis, we utilize data farming techniques to create a 
large data set by simulating a multitude of factor combinations over a substantial number 
of iterations. Through data analysis, analysts can better understand how these factors (and 
interactions among these factors) affect the measures of performance and measures of 
effectiveness. The analysis may help decision-makers make the kinds of assessments that 
can ultimately lead to real-world success. 
B. FACTORS OF INTEREST  
For our simulation experiment, we focus on two types of factors: controllable and 
uncontrollable. Controllable factors are those that the decision maker has control of in the 
real world, either through development or employment. These factors might include 
aircraft speed, weapons quantity, or sensor range. Quite often, the controllable factors are 
also called the decision variables or decision factors. Uncontrollable factors are those that 
cannot be controlled in the real world, even though they can be controlled within the 
simulation. These might include enemy characteristics such as quantity, speed, sensor 
range, and weapon performance, or might include environmental characteristics such as 
wind speed and cloud cover. Often these are referred to as the noise variables or 
uncontrollable variables. The uncontrollable and controllable factors in this thesis are 
summarized in Chapter II, Table 2 and 4, respectfully. We now discuss them in further 
detail. 
The MANA scenario uses nautical miles for battlefield dimensions and movement 
speeds, however, parameters like sensor range and weapons range use metric units. In 
many cases, conversions are necessary in order to successfully implement the data into 
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MANA. The most common conversion is meters to miles (1 mile = 1,609.344 meters) 
and meters to nautical miles (1 nautical mile = 1852 meters). 
1. Controllable Factors 
The following controllable factors are the main factors in the experimental design. 
For consistency, the labels are the same as those produced in MANA output, and the 
acronym NUCAS is shortened to UCAS. 
a. BlueSpd 
Blue speed is the speed, in knots, of the friendly aircraft. Blue speed varies 
from 250 to 650 knots. Since the scenario requires that the strike package maintain 
formation, the same speed is used for all friendly aircraft within a particular simulation 
run. This technique, known as lock-stepping, reduces the number of distinct factors that 
are varied for the experimental design. As discussed in Chapter II, Blue speed is 
converted to MANA units by dividing the speed (in knots) by ten. A speed of 500 knots 
corresponds to a MANA speed of 50. 
b. UCASQnty 
UCAS quantity is the number of UCAS aircraft. This number varies from 
1 to 12. The upper limit of 12 is chosen because current CAW squadron aircraft are 
limited to roughly 10 to 12 aircraft. 
c. UCASStlth 
UCAS stealth is the UCAS aircraft concealment in percent. This value 
varies from 98 to 100. These values correspond to a RCS of 0.0015 to 0.0001 m2 
(Grining, 2000). We used a conversion of 100 ( 1000)RCS   concealment. Integer 




UCAS sensor range is the distance at which the UCAS classifies other 
squads. This value varies from 60 to 100 nautical miles. These distances are based on a 
similar radar system used in the F/A-18, the AN/APG-73 (Jane's Avionics, 2010). 
e. UCASSnsrApture 
UCAS sensor aperture is the sensor arc width. This value varies from 40 to 
120 degrees (Jane's Avionics, 2010). Squads that are within the range and aperture of the 
UCAS sensor will be classified; squads that are outside the range or aperture of the 
UCAS sensor will not. 
f. UCASWpnQnty 
UCAS weapons quantity is the number of GBU-31 JDAM weapons that 
each UCAS carries, and is either 1 or 2. The GBU-31 is a 2,000-pound Mk84 bomb fitted 
with a GPS-guidance kit (Wikipedia, 2010). The maximum weapons load-out for the 
UCAS is 4,500 pounds (Northrop Grumman, 2010), thus the reason for the upper limit. 
g. UCASWpnRange 
GBU31 weapons range is the range of the GBU-31 JDAM. This value 
varies from 5 to 17 miles (Wikipedia, 2010). 
h. GBU31WpnPhit 
GBU31 weapon probability of hit (Phit) is the probability that the GBU-31 
hits the target. This value varies from 0.0 to 1.00. 
i. F18Qnty 
F/A-18 quantity is the number of F/A-18E/F Super Hornet aircraft. This 
number varies from 1 to 12. The upper limit of 12 is chosen because current CAW 
squadron aircraft are limited to roughly 10 to 12 aircraft. 
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j. F18Lead 
F/A-18 lead is the distance, in nautical miles, that the F/A-18E/F Super 
Hornet is in front of the strike aircraft. This lead distance is important in that it gives the 
F/A-18 time to detect and destroy a threat before the threat targets the strike aircraft. This 
distance varies from 0 to 200 nautical miles. F/A-18 lead distance is converted to a y-
coordinate start location (y = 27.5 to 47.5) when inputted into the MANA model. 
k. F18Stlth 
F/A-18 stealth is aircraft concealment in percent. This value varies from 
25 to 90. These values correspond to a RCS of 0.075 to 0.01 m2 (Grining, 2000). A 
conversion of 100 ( 1000)RCS concealment   is used. 
l. F18SnsrRnge 
F/A-18 sensor range is the distance at which the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet 
classifies other squads. This value varies from 60 to 100 nautical miles. These distances 
are based on the AN/APG-73 RADAR characteristics (Jane's Avionics, 2010). 
m. F18SnsrApture 
F/A-18 sensor aperture is the sensor arc width. This value varies from 40 
to 120 degrees. Squads that are within the range and aperture of the F/A-18 sensor will be 
classified; squads that are outside the range or aperture of the F/A-18 sensor will not. 
n. AIM120WpnQnty 
AIM-120 weapons quantity is the number of AIM-120 AMRAAM missile 
carried by either the F/A-18 or the F-35C. AIM-120 weapons quantity varies from 1 to 6. 
This factor is lock-stepped, ensuring that every F/A-18 and F-35Cs will carry the same 
quantity of AIM-120 missiles.  
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o. AIM120WpnRange 
AIM-120 weapons range is the range of the AIM-120 AMRAAM missile 
carried by either the F/A-18 or the F-35C. This value varies from 31 to 95 nautical miles 
(Jane's Air-Launched Weapons, 2010). This factor is lock-stepped between the F/A-18s 
and F-35C. 
p. AIM120WpnPhit 
AIM-120 weapon probability of hit (Phit) is the probability that the AIM-
120 AMRAAM missile hits the target. This value varies from 0.0 to 1.00. 
q. AIM9WpnQnty 
AIM-9 weapons quantity is the number of AIM-9 Sidewinder missile 
carried by either the F/A-18 or the F-35C. AIM-9 weapons quantity varies from 2 to 4. 
This factor is lock-stepped, therefore, every F/A-18 and F-35C carries the same quantity 
of AIM-9 missiles.  
r. AIM9WpnRange 
AIM-9 weapons range is the range of the AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles 
carried by either the F/A-18 or the F-35C. This value varies from 6 to 11 nautical miles 
(Jane's Air-Launched Weapons, 2009). This factor is lock-stepped between the F/A-18s 
and F-35C. 
s. AIM9WpnPhit 
AIM-120 weapon probability of hit (Phit) is the probability that the AIM-
120 AMRAAM missile hits the target. This value varies from 0.0 to 1.00. 
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t. F35Qnty 
F-35 quantity is the number of F-35C JSF aircraft. This number varies 
from 1 to 12. The upper limit of 12 is chosen because current CAW squadron aircraft are 
limited to roughly 10 to 12 aircraft. 
u. F35Lead 
F-35 lead distance is the distance, in nautical miles, that the F-35C JSF is 
in front of the strike aircraft. This lead distance is important in that it gives the JSF time 
to detect and destroy a threat before the threat targets the strike aircraft. This distance 
varies from 0 to 200 nautical miles. F-35 lead distance is converted to a y-coordinate 
(y = 27.5 to 47.5) start location when inputted into the MANA model. 
v. F35Stlth 
F-35 stealth is the aircraft concealment in percent. This value varies from 
98 to 100. These values correspond to a RCS from 0.005 to 0.0015 m2 (Grining, 2000). A 
conversion of 100 ( 1000)RCS concealment   is used. Integer values are required for 
MANA, therefore concealment is rounded to the nearest integer value.  
w. F35SnsrRng 
F-35 sensor range is the distance at which the F-35C JSF classifies other 
squads. This value varies from 60 to 120 nautical miles. These distances are based on the 
AN/APG-81 RADAR characteristics (Northrop Grumman, 2010). 
x. F35SnsrApture 
F-35 sensor aperture is the sensor arc width. This value varies from 40 to 
180 degrees (Northrop Grumman, 2010). Squads that are within the range and aperture of 
the F-35 sensor will be classified; squads that are outside the range or aperture of the  
F-35 sensor will not. 
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2. Uncontrollable Factors 
The following uncontrollable factors were chosen for the experimental design. 
For consistency, the labels are the same as those in MANA output. 
a. J10CapQty 
J-10 CAP quantity is the number of J-10 aircraft that are on CAP station. 
This number varies from 1 to 20. The upper limit of 20 is chosen because modern day 
aircraft are rarely deployed in groups larger than 12 to 15 aircraft. 
b. J10CapSpd 
J-10 CAP speed is the speed, in knots, of the J-10 aircraft. J-10 CAP speed 
varies from 250 to 800 knots (Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 2010). J-10 CAP speed is 
converted to MANA units by dividing the speed (in knots) by ten. 
c. J10CapStlth 
J-10 CAP stealth is the aircraft concealment in percent. This value varies 
from 25 to 90. Values used are similar to the F/A-18 Super Hornet. These values 
correspond to a RCS of 0.075 to 0.01 m2 (Grining, 2000). A conversion of 
100 ( 1000)RCS concealment   is used. 
d. PL12Ammo 
PL-12 weapons quantity is the number of PL-12 active-RADAR missiles 
carried by the J-10. PL-12 weapons quantity varies from 1 to 6. This factor is lock-




PL-12 weapons range is the range of the PL-12 missile carried by the J-10. 
This value varies from 35 to 50 nautical miles (Jane's Air-Launched Weapons, 2009). 
This factor is lock-stepped between both the CAP J-10 and the Alert J-10. 
f. PL12WpnPhit 
PL-12 weapon probability of hit (Phit) is the probability, in percent, that 
the PL-12 missile hits the target. This value varies from 0.0 to 1.00. 
g. PL8Ammo 
PL-8 weapons quantity is the number of PL-8 infra-red guided missile 
carried by the J-10. PL-8 weapons quantity varies from 2 to 4. This factor is lock-stepped, 
therefore every CAP J-10 and Alert J-10 carries the same quantity of PL-8 missiles. 
h. PL8WpnRng 
PL-8 weapons range is the range of the PL-8 missile carried by the J-10. 
This value varies from 2 to 10 nautical miles (Jane's Air-Launched Weapons, 2009). This 
factor is lock-stepped between both the CAP J-10 and the Alert J-10. 
i. PL8WpnPhit 
PL-8 weapon probability of hit (Phit) is the probability that the PL-8 
missile hits the target. This value varies from 0.0 to 1.00. 
j. J10AlertQty 
J-10 alert quantity is the maximum number of J-10 aircraft that are in alert 
status. The J-10 alert aircraft will randomly launch from the enemy airfield. This number 
varies from 1 to 20. The upper limit of 20 is chosen because modern day aircraft are 
rarely deployed in groups larger than 12 to 15 aircraft. 
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k. J10AlertSpd 
J-10 alert speed is the speed, in knots, of the J-10 aircraft. J-10 alert speed 
varies from 250 to 800 knots (Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 2010). J-10 alert speed is 
converted to MANA units by dividing the speed (in knots) by ten. 
l. J10AlertStlth 
J-10 alert stealth is the aircraft concealment in percent. This value varies 
from 25 to 90. Values used are similar to that of the F/A-18 Super Hornet. These values 
correspond to a RCS of 0.075 to 0.01 m2 (Grining, 2000). A conversion of 
100 ( 1000)RCS concealment   is used. 
C. THE EXPERIMENT  
We built the MANA model in steps. The first step involved researching and 
manually entering all the agents, behaviors, and variables for the baseline model into the 
MANA simulation. MANA’s well-documented and intuitive menus made this process 
fairly easy, but this was still the most time-consuming step. 
Once all the variables were entered into the MANA simulation, the process of 
testing the model began. We accomplished this by running the model while adding agents 
and variables in steps. First; we created and tested the interactions between friendly and 
J-10 CAP aircraft. Second, we modeled and tested the interaction between the NUCAS 
strike aircraft and the target area. Third, we added the J-10 alert aircraft and coded them 
to randomly launch from their start position. Finally, we examined many individual 
model runs to ensure proper interaction among all agents. 
Testing and debugging the interactions of squads was essential to ensure that the 
model simulated real-world operations appropriately. We accomplished this by the 
extensive use of two features of MANA—the control buttons, and the squad situational 
awareness map. 
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The control button functions can used to run, pause, reset, and slow down the 
model. In addition, a random seed value can be entered and locked in order to investigate 
a particular behavior. Figure 4 shows a screen capture of the control functions. 
 
Figure 4.   Screen Capture of the Various Control Buttons (From Defense 
Technology Agency, 2010) 
We used the squad situational awareness map to troubleshoot the interactions of 
various squads. A wide variety of information on situational awareness for each squad 
can be shown, including detections, friendly squad classifications, and threat squad 
classifications with their associated threat level. Figure 5 shows the situational awareness 
map for the F-35C JSF at the beginning of the simulation. The red squares in the center of 
the screen have been classified as enemies, while the white squares are contacts that have 
been detected but are not within the range to be classified. The blue triangles are the 
friendly units that are in the same squad. 
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Figure 5.   Screen Capture of Squad Situational Awareness Map (From 
Defense Technology Agency, 2010) 
After completing the MANA simulation and ensuring that the model was working 
correctly, it was time to run the experiment. To do this, we needed an efficient 
experimental design. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Cioppa developed a class of 
experimental designs called Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercubes (NOLHs) while 
earning his doctorate at NPS, Monterey, CA. The NOLH design “combines orthogonal 
Latin hypercubes and uniform designs to create designs having near orthogonality and 
excellent space-filling properties” (Cioppa and Lucas, 2007). Hernandez et al. (2009) 
propose variants of these designs that are even more efficient and allow a larger number 
of factors to be explored. In this thesis, we examine 36 different factors with some factors 
having a wide variety of levels between their minimum and maximum values. If this 
thesis were to just evaluate the eight NUCAS factors and their associated levels, the 
number of different combinations would reach 1.145 trillion! The value of the NOLH is 
that a broad section of the input space can be covered without having to produce 
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simulations on the entire set of input combinations. In the case of this thesis, we examine 
240 different combinations by implementing the NOHL design, using the ranges of factor 
levels specified in Table 2 and Table 4 for the uncontrollable and controllable factors, 
respectively. The scatterplot matrix of Figure 6 shows the orthogonality and space-filling 
properties of the NOHL design used for the 24 controllable factors. The portions of the 
design for the uncontrollable factors (not shown) are similar.  Although some factors take 
on a limited number of discrete levels, which tends to degrade the orthogonality, the 
maximum pairwise correlation between any two columns is less than 0.1. 
 
Figure 6.   Scatterplot Matrix of Controllable Factors (From SAS Institute, 
2010) 
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These 240 combinations were then entered into an executable scripting file called 
oldmcdata, written by my associate Steve Upton of NPS, that automatically updates the 
MANA XML file, produces a separate XML file for each of the 240 different 
combinations, and launches these on a computing cluster, in order to automate the 
MANA simulated runs and then collect the output data into a single comma-separated 
(CSV) file. These XML files are then ran on a cluster of 68 processors operated by the 
Simulation Experiments and Efficient Design (SEED) Center for Data Farming at NPS. 
50 runs of each MANA XML file were executed making for a total of 12,000 individual 
simulations. On a single processor, 12,000 runs would have taken 50 hours. Using the 68-
processor cluster, it took just 45 minutes, emphasizing the advantage of using NOLH 
experimental design in combination with the computational power of the cluster. 
The entire process of creating the data file from the MANA simulation was 
surprisingly short, especially when compared to the extensive amount of research and 
development that went into creating and testing the baseline MANA simulation model. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. DATA STRUCTURE 
The single CSV output file contains the following additional information: 
 All controllable and uncontrollable factors with their appropriate values 
 Run numbers 
 Random seed numbers 
 Steps required to run the simulations 
 Casualty rates for every squad 
 Injury rates for every squad 
All analysis was performed on this CSV file exclusively using Version 8.0 of a 
statistical package developed by the SAS Institute called JMP (SAS Institute, 2010). As 
we state in Chapter I, two Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) are of interest in this thesis: 
Proportion of target destruction, and proportion of friendly survivors. Generating the 
percentage of friendly casualties was accomplished by taking the number of friendly 
aircraft remaining at the end of the simulation and dividing by the number of friendly 
aircraft available at the start of the simulation. The blue casualty proportion was 
converted to blue survivability proportion by taking 1 minus the blue casualty proportion. 
A conversion from meters to miles was also performed in order to return the data to 
United States customary systems units: 1 meter is equal to 0.000621 miles. 
B. INSIGHT INTO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Chapter I lists the two research questions that directed the thesis: 
 What combination of manned and unmanned aircraft provides the best 
mission success rate? 
 What operational factors allow the NUCAS to complete its mission with 
limited loss rate? 
 36
A histogram of blue survivability shows that a large proportion (1180 
simulations) of the 12,000 simulated runs result in zero percent blue survivability rate. 
The histogram with quantiles and moments is shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Histogram of Blue Survivability (From SAS Institute, 2010) 
A histogram of target casualty shows the binomial characteristics of target 
casualty rate being either destroyed (1) or not destroyed (0). The mean of 0.505 indicates 
that there are slightly more destroyed targets (6064 simulations) than undestroyed targets 
(5936 simulations). 
Throughout the rest of this chapter, the summary data file that comes from 
collapsing over the 50 replications for each of the different input factor combinations is 
referenced. This summary data file has only 240 rows of data; each row contains the 
input factor settings for one design point, along with the mean of each of the casualty 
statistics and MOEs for that design point. This summarization has some advantages for 
graphical displays and comparisons, and does not affect the magnitudes of any factor 
effect estimates in regression models or regression trees. However, the reader should note 
that the R Squared (R2) for the regression models and regression trees are higher when 
used to predict the mean of 50 observations than when used on the raw data.  Note also 
that some of graphs and charts in this chapter use the labels “Mean(BlueSurv%)” but 
these are really proportions (varying from zero to one) rather than percents (varying from 
zero to 100). 
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1. What Combination of Aircraft Provides the Best Mission Success 
Rate? 
Mission success is a function of the target casualty proportion. We used stepwise 
regression to fit the mean target casualty proportion using all controllable input factors, 
quadratic effects, and all two-way interactions as potential terms in the model. Figure 8 
shows the significant terms that explain roughly 88 percent of the variability in the mean 
target casualties. By convention, main effects are retained in the model for any factor 
appearing with significant interaction or quadratic effects. 
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Figure 8.   Regression Analysis of Mean Proportion of Target Casualties 
(After SAS Institute, 2010) 
Significant factors 
explain 88 percent of 






The significant factors that have the most influence are GBU-31 Phit, NUCAS 
quantity, weapon quantity, stealth, and sensor aperture. A high R2 value of 88 percent is 
obtained without considering the uncontrollable factors in the regression. This suggests 
that the uncontrollable factors, like enemy quantity, weapons range, and stealth, do not 
play as nearly an important role on mean target casualty rate as the controllable factors.  
Regression tree analysis is another useful tool to determine influential factors, and 
it avoids problems of predictions outside of the [0,1] range for target casualty rates. 
Figure 9 shows a regression tree using the response variable mean target casualty and all 
the controllable input factors. This regression tree has five splits with an R2 value of 
0.641. This tree is read from top to bottom, with the top factors having a larger influence 
on the response variable. Branches on the right are preferred since the goal is to have a 
higher target casualty percentage. This is shown in Figure 9, by a red box indicating the 
poorest performing factor combinations and a green box indicating the best performing 
factor combinations.  
 
Figure 9.   Regression Tree for Mean Target Casualty (After SAS Institute, 
2010) 
Many of the same factors that are identified as important with the stepwise 
regression, are also important using the regression tree: GBU-31 Phit, NUCAS quantity, 
and sensor aperture. The regression tree also includes information about NUCAS 
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quantity: When the GBU-31 has a high Phit, then missions involving quantities of less 
than three NUCAS aircraft have an average mean target casualty rate of only 0.22, while 
missions involving three or more NUCAS have, on average, a mean target casualty rate 
of 0.70. This indicates that three or more NUCAS is desirable because substantial 
improvements in target casualty rates can be achieved. 
Graphing the mean target casualty rate versus NUCAS quantity gives further 
insight to using three or more NUCAS aircraft. A box plot of the mean target casualty 
rate versus NUCAS quantity (Figure 10) shows a very distinct difference of the slope of 
mean target casualty from zero to three NUCAS aircraft. The slope levels out after three, 
suggesting that having a larger number of NUCAS aircraft is preferred but the marginal 
gains are smaller beyond three NUCAS aircraft. 
 
Figure 10.   Box Plot of Mean Target Casualty Rate Versus NUCAS 
Quantity (After SAS Institute, 2010) 
We evaluate NUCAS weapon quantity and stealth further by using box plots as 
shown in Figure 11. 
 
Mean target casualty 
rates increase 
significantly when 
UCAS quantity is 3 
or higher  
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Figure 11.   Box Plots of Mean Target Casualty Rate Versus NUCAS 
Weapons Quantity and NUCAS Stealth (From SAS Institute, 
2010) 
Both of the box plots of target casualty rates versus NUCAS weapons quantity 
and NUCAS stealth show the mean values are clearly improving as weapons quantity and 
stealth improve. A military significance can also be inferred, especially when 
improvements in mean target casualty rate increase from approximately 40 to 60 percent. 
GBU-31 Phit and sensor aperture are major factors determined from the 
regression, and deserves further exploration. Using the prediction profile option of JMP, 
a curve of the expected mean target casualty percentage versus each factor is shown. 
Figure 12 shows the prediction profile curves for both GBU-31 Phit and NUCAS sensor 
aperture. The polynomial effects on the regression model are shown in the curvature of 
the mean target casualty line. The mean target casualty percentage versus GBU-31 Phit 
displays significant gains as GBU-31 Phit increases but begins to level off after GBU-31 
Phit of 0.8 percent. Similarly, the mean target casualty percentage versus NUCAS sensor 
aperture displays significant gains as the sensor aperture increases, but gains level off and 




Figure 12.   Side-by-Side Prediction Profile Curves of Mean Target Casualty 
Rate Versus GBU-31 Phit and NUCAS Sensor Aperture (After 
SAS Institute, 2010) 
In conclusion, the success of the target destruction is a direct result of the NUCAS 
factors. This conclusion makes sense in the simulation; the NUCAS is the only aircraft 
capable of destroying the ground-based target. One might expect that manned F-35C and 
F/A-18 quantities would also be important factors since the survivability of the NUCAS 
is directly related to how well the manned aircraft protect the NUCAS. However, based 
on the regression analysis, F-35C quantity and F/A-18 quantity are not major 
determinants of the target casualty rate. This may suggest that NUCAS aircraft have 
relative success if used autonomously, without OCA support of the F-35C or F/A-18. 
2. What Factors Contribute to Minimal Blue Loss Rate? 
Mission success is determined by effectively destroying the target. However, 
losing a majority of the aircraft directly affects the CAW’s ability for further strikes. 
Developing tactics that ensure target destruction while minimizing blue loss rate is of 
vital importance if future TACAIR operations are necessary. 
A stepwise regression on mean blue survivability rate was performed using all the 
controllable input factors, quadratic terms, and two-way interactions. Figure 13 shows the 
significant factors that explain roughly 60 percent of the variability in the response. 
 43
 
Figure 13.   Regression Analysis of Mean Blue Survivability Proportion 





explain 60 percent of 




The significant factors that have the most influence are F-35C quantity, NUCAS 
quantity, AIM-120 Weapon Phit, and stealth of the NUCAS and F-35C. 
Figure 14 shows a regression tree of mean blue survivability using all the 
controllable input factors as potential explanatory factors. This regression tree has five 
splits with an R2 value of 0.275. Like the previous tree, this tree is read from top to 
bottom, with the top factors having a larger influence on the response variable. Branches 
on the right tend to be preferred since the goal is to have a higher target casualty 
percentage. This is shown in Figure 14 by a red box indicating the poorest performing 
factor combinations, and a green box indicating the best performing factor combinations.  
 
 
Figure 14.   Regression Tree for Mean Blue Survivability Percentage (After 
SAS Institute, 2010) 
The regression tree shows that many of the same factors that are important with 
the stepwise regression are also important using the regression tree: F-35C quantity, 
NUCAS quantity, F-35C stealth, and NUCAS stealth. Quantities of less than nine F-35C 
aircraft have the greatest effect on blue survivability percentage. The regression tree also 
highlights that, even with the small number of splits, there is a wide variation in mean  
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blue survivability rates, ranging from 0.33 to 0.81 (33 percent to 81 percent). This 
suggests that F-35C aircraft quantities greater than nine are not enough to lead to high 
mean blue survivability rates. 
For a more detailed look at the effects of F-35C quantity on survivability, a box 
plot of the mean blue survivability rate versus F-35C quantity is shown in Figure 15. A 
similar box plot showing mean blue survivability rate versus NUCAS quantity is shown 
in Figure 16.  
 
 
Figure 15.   Box Plot of Mean Blue Survivability Percentage Versus F-35C 
Quantity (After SAS Institute, 2010) 
It is of interest to note that when a line is drawn through the mean of each of the 
F-35C quantities, the curve is noticeably steeper from three to four (and again from eight 
to ten aircraft). This suggests, that based on the simulation data, increasing the quantity of 
F-35Cs aircraft from four to eight does not offer considerable advantages. However, 
using nine or more aircraft does improve the blue survivability percentage. 
 
No substantial 
increase in blue 
survivability rates 




Figure 16.   Box Plot of Mean Blue Survivability Percentage Versus 
NUCAS Quantity (After SAS Institute, 2010) 
When evaluating the box plot of mean blue survivability percentage versus 
NUCAS quantity, a similar significant reduction in mean blue survivability percentage 
occurs when NUCAS quantity is greater than three aircraft. This is especially interesting 
since three or more NUCAS aircraft is the preferred number when mean target casualty 
rate is the response variable. Figure 17 is a side-by-side comparison of mean target 
casualty rate and mean blue survivability rate versus NUCAS quantity: 
 
Figure 17.   Side-by-Side Comparison of Mean Target Casualty Rate and 
Mean Blue Survivability Rate Versus NUCAS Quantity (After 
SAS Institute, 2010) 
A significant 
increase in blue 
survivability 
percentage when 
UCAS quantity is 
greater than three. 
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NUCAS and F-35 stealth are major factors determined from the regression, and 
deserve further exploration. Using the prediction profile option of JMP, a curve of the 
expected mean blue survivability percentage versus each factor is shown. Figure 18 
shows the prediction profile curves for both NUCAS stealth and F-35 stealth. Both of the 
curves clearly show that blue survivability rate increases with stealth. Both of these 
graphs show the military significance of stealth in mean blue survivability. Small 
percentile gains of just 0.02 in stealth result in gains of at least 15 percent in mean blue 
survivability. 
 
Figure 18.   Prediction Profile Curves of Mean Blue Survivability 
Percentage Versus NUCAS Stealth and F-35C Stealth (After 
SAS Institute, 2010) 
AIM-120 weapon Phit is another major factor determined from the regression, and 
deserves further exploration. A prediction profile curve showing blue survivability rate 
versus AIM-120 Weapon Phit is shown in Figure 19. This linear relationship shows a 
significant increase in mean blue survivability rate as AIM-120 Phit increases. This 





Figure 19.   Prediction Profile Curve of Mean Blue Survivability Percent 
Versus AIM-120 Weapons Phit (After SAS Institute, 2010) 
In conclusion, the major factors that reduce the blue survivability percentage 
include F-35C quantity, NUCAS quantity, AIM-120 weapon Phit, NUCAS stealth, and F-
35C stealth. F-35C quantity is the most important factor; however, no substantial increase 
in blue survivability rates are seen when the quantity of F-35C aircraft ranged from four 
to nine aircraft. NUCAS quantity is the second most important factor, showing that three 
or more NUCAS aircraft are preferred. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This purpose of this thesis is to gain some insight to the following questions: 
What combination of manned and unmanned aircraft provides the best mission success 
rate? What operational factors allow the NUCAS to complete its mission with limited 
loss rate to manned and unmanned aircraft? 
1. What Combination of Aircraft Provides the Best Mission Success 
Rate? 
When the response factor was target casualty percentage, the regression model 
analysis shows that NUCAS quantities of three or more produce significant gains in 
mission success rate. Box plot analysis shows that maximizing the NUCAS weapons 
quantity and stealth are militarily significant factors. Using the regression model 
produced from stepwise regression, the prediction profiler curves show that NUCAS 
sensor apertures near 92 degrees lead to improved target casualty rates. The prediction 
profile curves also show that improvements to GBU-31 weapon Phit percentages lead to 
increases in target casualty rates as well. 
2. What Factors Contribute to Minimal Blue Loss Rate? 
When blue survivability is the response factor, regression analysis shows that a 
NUCAS quantity of three or more aircraft produces significant gains in blue 
survivability. F-35C quantities between four and nine aircraft also aid in blue 
survivability rates. The prediction profiler curves show that NUCAS and F-35C stealth 
are important factors. In addition, the prediction profile curves shows AIM-120 weapon 





We recommended that, based on the scenario and simulation data provided: 
 NUCAS aircraft should be operated in a group of at least three to four 
aircraft. Military aviators have a long history of working in a section of 
two or a division of four aircraft. Based on the reality of equipment 
failure, we recommended that NUCAS operate in a division of four 
aircraft in order maximize both probability of target destruction and blue 
survivability. 
 F-35C aircraft should operate in a group of at least four aircraft when used 
for OCA missions against a large number of enemy aircraft. Marginal 
gains in blue survivability are achieved by increasing the quantity of F-
35Cs beyond four aircraft. 
 Stealth is an important factor for both successful target destruction and 
blue survivability. The F-35C proved to outperform the F/A-18 even when 
sensor and weapons parameters were equal among the two aircraft. 
 Weapons Phit is a major factor in target destruction and blue survivability. 
Weapons technology advances must continue to improve thus ensuring Phit 
efficiency is maintained. 
C. CONTINUED RESEARCH 
This thesis originally included three scenarios that were to be evaluated. In 
addition to the coordinated strike scenario, a Defensive Counter Air (DCA) scenario and 
an autonomous NUCAS long-range strike were developed. Both of the scenarios were 
implemented into MANA with extensive testing done on both simulation models.  
The DCA scenario model uses F/A-18 and F-35C manned aircraft that are 
positioned at a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) station. The CAP aircraft intercept and destroy 
inbound strike aircraft that approach randomly. The NUCAS is equipped as an in-flight 
refueling platform with external tanks and a central refueling pod. As F/A-18 and F-35C 
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aircraft require fuel, the NUCAS will intercept and rendezvous with manned aircraft to 
provide fuel necessary for continued airborne operations. Research questions include: 
How many NUCAS and DCA aircraft are needed in order to provide statistical gains in 
DCA effectiveness? Which factors are most important in managing DCA effectiveness? 
Figure 20 shows a MANA screen-shot of the DCA scenario. 
 
Figure 20.   MANA Screen Shot of DCA Scenario (From Defense 
Technology Agency, 2010) 
The autonomous long-range strike scenario model was developed to look strictly 
at the factors of the NUCAS. The scenario is a long-range strike where NUCAS aircraft 
are designated to destroy a target deep into enemy territory. Threats include long-range 
strategic and medium range tactical Surface to Air Missile (SAM) sites. The NUCAS 
route is predetermined to fly into the enemy territory, strike the target, and then egress 
while avoiding the Weapon Engagement Zones (WEZ) of the strategic SAM threats. The 
tactical SAM threats are randomized throughout the enemy territory. If the NUCAS 
successfully detects the tactical SAM threat then the UCAS will attempt to maneuver 
away from the WEZ. Research questions include: How many UCAS aircraft are required 
 52
to successfully destroy the target? What factors are crucial to the success of the mission? 
What factors are crucial to the survivability of the UCAS? Figure 21 shows a MANA 
screen-shot of the long-range strike scenario: 
 
 
Figure 21.   MANA Screen Shot of Long-Range Strike Scenario (From 
Defense Technology Agency, 2010) 
Since much of the research and development has been done on these two 
scenarios, it would be advantageous to continue with the design of experiments and 
analysis of these two models. This information, used in combination with the coordinated 
strike scenario described in this thesis, would provide valuable insight into the future of 
NUCAS operations and CAW combat performance. 
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